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INTRODUCTI-0.
The subject of this thosis from a practical point
of view has grown to groat ivrortanc; durin.1 tho last century.
This has been brought about b- t"e introdhctic> of the stoam
railro ., z.hich -ook the 'lr:.v of that :.ci:'n>. i)dC of con-
Before thlat time the various doctrines which were laid
down to regulate the liability of Masters and Servants were
of very little importance and their use was very seldom
invoked. Now all is changed. Instcad of the slow and
practically safe stage coaches, we have the whole country
intersected with the steam railway on which accidents happen
every hour.
Alt ough some of the Roman roads, like the Appian Way,
were a near approach to tho modern railway, yet they differed
in many important particulars. They were simply granite
stonoc fitted tightly together upon ',.hich low wagons were
pushed along.
The first odea of tracks for the wheels to run
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upon was not brought into practice until the yoar 1676.
This although not a inode.'n railvwy waz otill a stop towards
it. it was not until the year 1829, that steam was in any
way used for the purposes of propelling the cars. In this
year the Liverpool and 11anchoster railroad was built which
although slow and cunbe-some, was still a great success.
Upon this basis the railway has devoloped until today it is
one of the greatest wonders of the age.
With the developmont of the railway that vexed and
troublesome question, as to whether and in what cases the
Company is liable for injuries to their employees, has been
raised.
WHO AR3; 7E-APLOYT'K. S.
The first question to be conlsidered on this subject
is who are employees.
The comwmon and the legal understandings of the word
em.loyue is not the same. The latter is broader and com-
prehends not only the former but cases in which the parties
are employer and employee only in a peculiar sense., and for
certain purp-oses.
According to the coimnon unde2standing an employee is one
who engaes in the service of anothrr, for the purpose of
doing some la,;ful labor for a consideration.
The case of Hill v. Liorey, 28 Vt.,178, is a very good
case to show the distinction betweoen the two. There the
plaintiff and defendant wore engaged in repairing a line
fence. WVhile so engaged one Stuyveso:;, came along and
without any request at all from the defend at began helping
him. While so engaged he cut down trees which belonged to
plainltiff. Thereupon plaintiff' sued defendant for trespass
and the court held that Stuyveo-on vas zcn employec of the de-
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fendant although his services were gratuitously and had not
been asked for by the plaintiff.
Accordingly it hao been held that when one persian for
the time being, places hirself in the position of a subordi-
nate to another in the business of the latter and by what he
may do in that condition of subordination a third party is
injured, sich third party has a rig)ht to regard him as occu-
pying the position of an employee.
The importance of determining whether a man is an em-
ployee or not can be seen from the case of Everhart v. The
Terre Haute & Indianapolis R.R.Co., 78 Ind., (92. Here
one Everhart, at the request of the conductor of a freight
train, climbed on a car for the purpose of putting on a brake.
While on the car the engineer carelessly and willfully un-
coupled the car nd Everhart was thrown off and permanently
injured. The point in question in this case ,,as whether
Everhart by getting on the car became a co-em-)loyee of the
enr ineer or not-- If he di . he could not recover. But it
was held by C.J.VWordess, that he was a mere volunteer and
could recover; but that if he had been a co-emiployee he
could not.
HIaving dotorined v' 'ljothor a person is .n employee or not
the next thing to be considered io tho employor's lilbility
to him in case of accidont.
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TUI- LIABILITY OF THE' 'OIIPATY FOR
INJURIES TO THEIR 0PLOTI]ES .
It is a general rule followed in both England and
the United Z]tates that a servant who is injured by the negli-
genco or misconduct of his fellow-servant can maintain no
action 4against the company for such injury.
This rule was first laid dovm by Lord Abinger in the
celebrated case of Priectly v. Fowler, 5 U & W., 1, and
became settled law of England ever after.
In 1841, this principle was declared in South Car~lina,
without any reference to the English case, in the case of
Murray v. S.C.R.R.Co., I 1cMulln,585. Although no refer-
ence was nade to the English case the doctrine. was substan-
tially the same.
The f acts in the ,.se vere that one mluarray was employed
by the S.C.R.R.Co., as a second fiicman, and put on a train
manned by a competent engineer and fireman. Vhile approach-
ing a tunnel a horse vwus observed to be feeding on the track.
The engine-;r's attenation vas dran to this fact but he paid
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no attention to it, until they vicro almost upon the animal.
It being then to late to stop, the horse was run over, and
the engine thrown from the tra1c. At this moment Murray
attempted to jump but his foot caug t in the tender and was
cut off.
It was admitted by both oarties that the accident was
caused ;,hclly through t--e negligence of "h m ,ninfr.
After receiving all the facts, C.J.EvLns laid down the
rule that an cmfloye.r lwas not liable for injuries received by
an <vemrployec through the negligence or misconduct of a co-em-
ployee.
One year after, in 1842, tnis doctrine was affirmed in
Fassell v. B.& W.R.R.Co., 4 Miet .,49,. The opinion was writ-
yis thout o the most noted case or
ton by .J$a, iJ1 is Ltot '
this ;point th:at hts boon dzcided in this country or in Eng-
land. The factc. were those: One Farrell u, as employed by
the Railway Company as an engineer on a )assenger train.
The train was thrown off the track through the negligcnce of
a c-7it o n.a.. By -his act Farrl's l:id v. crushed and
he brought an action against the Company for damages. The
-6-
learned Justice after dicu..ss ing the -points fully
concludes by saying; that, 1 who enga 'Cs in the crploy-
ment of another for the performance of specified duties and
services for compeonsationI takes upon himself the natural and
ordinary riske and perils incident to the performance of such
servico. They are perils which he is as likely to know, and
against which he can as effectually gvard, as the master.'
I Regarding it in this light, it is the ordinary case of one
sustaining an injurycin the courso of his own employment, in
which he must bear the loss himself', or seek his remedy if he
has any, against the actual vrongdoer.1" The loss must be
deemed to be the result of pure :_.Ccident, lihe those to which
all men, in all employments, and at all tiries, art". more or
less exposed;' ,nd like similar losses from accidental
causes, it must rest where it first fell."
The policy and justice of this doctrine has been much
questioned, and the rule itself has been rejected in the
states.
As a rule of law it is ntdoubtedly an unjus- one. For
why should not an employee recover just as much and just as
-7-
readily if he is injured by a co-employee as h '.7ould if
injured by the master himself? I cannot sco -.fy difference,
and although England and forty-tvwo st;.tes hold so. I will
be inclined to side with Kentucky & Tennessee which have es-
tablished or rather havc never accepted the doctrine.
The Company is lia.le for the negligent aots of its
employees to third crsons who are not connected with them
so upon what rinCiplos of justice is the reason of the rule
that a class of persons who occupy an inferior position as
servants of the road, and w;ho are injurc d by the negligent
acts of those occupying a parallel position, should not have
the right to recover against the Company for damages sus-
tained. I can see none.
Tennessee in the case of Haynes v. E.Tenn. &. Ga. R.R.Co.
3 Coldwell, 222, repudiates this doctrine entircly on the
ground that there is no sound reasoning at all in the cases
of llurray v. S.C.R.R.Co., and Farewell v. B. & l.R.R.Co..
Chief Justice Slacefford delivered the opinion of the
Court. :rter oing over and discussing all the points in
the cse fully he says, " The high charaCter- and rearing of
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many of the jurists, who havo ennunciated this principle
would have an infli--c-co with this Court in the dtcolrination
of this oucstion; but upon an examination of tho authorities
cited., wo are unable to see upon what principle a rule that
seems to us not foundcd in justice, nor cormuion right should
be upheld or maint-ined."
11entucky also refused to recognize this doctrine in the
case of Collin v. The Tenn. c Nashville R.R.Co., In this
case she allovior-1 a cormon laborer to recovo' damages which
had been causcd by the :cliience of an engineer. But by a
careful study of the case she ca--.nnot be said to have entirely
repudiated but only to have limited the rule. She seems to
agree with the other states that an employce cannot recover
for injury brought about by the negligence of a co-employee
with this limitation. She holds that if the injury is
brought about by the gross nogligence of a co-employeethe
company is liable.
The l ow en this point in Vfisconsin seems to have been in
great confusion up to l873. In 1858, the case of Chanberlain
v. The ,1.8. M.R.R.Co., 7 Wis.,425 arose. In this case the
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plaintiff an ex-ress i,-,nt on the road was hired to fill for
one trip the -lace of a braeman who ras sic. Ti1c en-
gaged in this kork he ,ras thrown from the car and had his log
crushed. The acici ont happened through the neglirence of
the engineer. Alihough the question at point did not come
squarely up, it ,-as decided by Justice Cole in a very well
written opinion that had he been a co-emnloycc of the engineer
he would not have been aloced to recover. The case was then
appealed on tis point and the prior decision reversed.
Justice Paine in giving the opinion for ieversing it says,"
It is conceded that the Company is bound to conduct the force
it sets in motidn with proper care and skill so upon what
princi:le can it be maintained that they nay, through their
engineer zo negligontly rianage the engine as to mangle the
brakeman and all their ot-er sorvonts on the train and yet
be entirely irresponsiblc?"
This decision seeningly put the law on this question at
rest -but not for long, foir three years after in 1861, another
case arose which resulted in the overruling of Chamrberlain v.
M.& M'.R.R.Co., and the substitution of' the general rule de-
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clared in M4urray v. S.C.R.R.Co., and FZa'roll v. D.& W.R.R.Co.
This was the case of A*osely v. Chav:-erlain, 18 'iis.,731.
The opinion ii this case was written by Chief Justice Dixon
who overrules Chsanmbc.ain v. I7. C I .R.R.Co, apparently with-
out any reasons. The only argument which he gives is that
all the rest of the states have gone the other way so he
thinks \is cons in Chould to.
This decision was so openly unjust and sujh a feeling
among the different membeesS of the beich that the legislature
passed a ztatute which decla.red this decision should not
apply to the enmployees of railways. Thus the law in Wis-
consin put at rest.
'"hich rule is right t:e ono laid down in Uss. or the
one in Tenn. will probably never be ILnoan; but were I to
decide I should most assuredly side with Tennessee.
It is said by most courts that when a person contracts
to do services on a railroad he taX s into account all the
dangers a °id perils which are incident to the enployont, but
I claim tY).t this can only be intended to mean such dangers
and perils as necessarily attend the business vThe*. conducted
with ordi;rary caru ad prudencc. He ctainly cannot be
prcsumed' to contract with refe-ronce to injuries inflicted on
him by negligence.
The Railway Company in setting a force in motion is
bound to see that it is employed with proper care and skill.
Other (tates have decided with I Iassachusetts but 6n an
entirely diffecnt ground--- that of public policy. It is
said that cmployous would be more vigilant to prevent injur-
ies from the negligonce of each other, if they knew that they
could not recover damages, against the Company , than they
would with the opposite belief.
-t this notion, it seems to me, is based upon a false
estimate of the motives which govern hriian action. In fact
the argunent on public policy I think is just the other way.
By just so much as the liability of the employer for the
negligence of his servan-t is reduced, by just so much are
the motives diminished w4hich induce him to employ servants
of the great_,est skill mid vigi.. And if from this re-
laxation, negligence servants are emnployed, the public at
large, as well as the other employees, run the hazard of the
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It is suggestcd in 7arrell v. 3.J 7.R.R.Oo., that an
employec vhon he sees th&at negligent p-rso:;s are om-,ployed,
may leave the service. '3uppose t.lat ti'suggestion -ia
Carriod out. Those o-i-loyecs ,,-Ao arc cacf'ul, Vi t and
attentive to their busin;ess findig that their are others
emploued who art. negli-('nt or reckless, vould. leave the ser-
vice, in obedince to the advice of the Supreme Court of 1.1ass.
'hoere vould the ,'lffare of the pub,-lic b then? All
the skillful and careful servants gone the iubli.c would be
left to the mercy of a handful of carnless and negligent
persons.
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WHO ARE CO-E2I1PLOYEES.
Who are co-omployees and who are not is p-robably
one of the most difficult questions that tLc Amc1,,ican Courts
have ever had to dfeal with.
. On account of this difficulty there are hardly two states
in the whole union that have oxactly the sao rule.
The rule which is given by most text-writers is that a
co-employee id one who serves the same employer; deriving
their authority and compensation from the same source, and
engaged in the same business, although it be in different
grades and departments thereof, arc fellow or co-servants,
each taking the risk of tihe other's negligence.
But this definition is to broad and svoeping, and by a
oareful reading of the cases I doubt if you could find a
singl,, state which does not have a groat iany exce-tions to it.
For exaple it ha., '(eOn held in Ohio that where a ser-
va.t was on-.aged in repairing a track, and was injured through
the carelessness of a fireman that the rule did not apply.
Still ith a few exceptions it can be laid down as the
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general rule in all the statcs except Yfass., We. or}, Ohio,
Indiana, T"cntilcky, &rA Tennessee.
The 1a .: in N.Y., on this point soers to be the best,
most clea: and certain of all the stu.tes.
The Courts of other states seem to have laid clovm very
arbitrary rules and regulations while the Courts of I.Y.,
have been riore lenicnt and equitable :o the ciT'p)loyee. This
can be seen by a study of the late-, decisions.
The rule b. ,-ich the 1.ov-rK s are gu ,ll d wle detormining
who are co-employees is this: Any e-loyee of the corpora-
tion engaged in providing to other -.cYaployecs, a place to work,
machinery, tools and aDilimnces to work with, co-o,1iloyees,
and rules and regulations of employment is a vice-principal
and the Corporation is l .le in damages to all employees who
are injurocl, thlough ,is negligence. Allother employees
who ore not cmployce: in providing eaiy of these things are
co-em-ploy ees o
Thi_ , T 4..tnk, can safely be sailc' to be the rule as the
casei s Vill show. Thus a brakemun can recover gamages for
injuries eceived thougl'] the 'lJigolnce of a track repairer,
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as the track rCrA-i: 'r is -roviding a tace o wro-1. A firo-
man could recover for injuricS ceived throh th, negligence
of a Mechanic in t.c car shops, who had been negligent in
fixing a brake; was in furnisL-ing
machinery-, tools, and a;Dlianccs for the firoman to work with.
A brakoman couldc recover for injurics receivd. through the
negligrcc; of a train disioatche", who h.- the authority and
did make rules for the running of trzlins. An engineer
could also recover for JL- .,r re-cive through the negli-
genc of a Ju;erin .ch .nt whose t . .... as to make rules and
regulat ions.
The Ohio Courts in dete-mining this question sem to go
upon the question of subordination or the -:ranlk and grade test
as it is most comnonly called. This rule was first declared
in the Little hia..ai R.R.Co. v. Stevens, He, Stevens an
erigno~n a,--, iured in a o,_!isston, n the Little Liu-ii R.
R. The collission was due to the negli:;o, - e arid careless-
ness of the conductor of the train. The Court allowed the
engineer to recover, saying, that he a;nd the conductor were
in subordinate positions and so were ,t .. -.c,,-.loyeos, but
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wore rathor in tho position of orployce and vice-principal.
After discussing all the roints fuuly thuy decided that whore
an floycr olaces one -erson in his or-,loy ner the direct-
ions of another, also in his employ, such employer is liable
for injmrio.s to the. porson of him -laced in the subordinate
situation.
This case was followed in The Lake 2hor & ichigan
Souther-n .R.Co. v. Tavalley, 36 O.S.R.,221. There Tavalley
a car repairer was ordered by one Fox, a foremmn to go under
a freit car fcarthe o of repairin- it. While under
the freigh' car an ct: n tched a ho- coal car on the
track which cane in collision with the car Tavalley was under.
The srd.n noving of the car severely injured him. The
Court held ha. t ho coirmany was liable. Justice Vaite, in
giving the opinion said that Tavalley could recover as he was
a subordinate and under the di ections of Fox whose duty it
was to take all all precautions to guar d against such acci-
dents. According in cther ca.ses.o they holC that a conductor
is not a co-employee of a broan. Nor a master mechanic of
a common la-borer in a car-shop,
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The law in KEntucky on this point favors the employee
more than the law of any other st-P.ate wi'tl the siagle exception
of Tennessee which has nevor. adopted -cho rule of Co-employee
non-liability at all. The first time that a case of this
kind ever came up was in 1865, in The Louisvill & Nashville
R.R.Co., v. Collins, !lere a commnon laborer was ordered by
an cnginecer to get under an engine for the purpose of fixing
it. While so engaged the engine moved forward and cut his
leg off. It was mrovod on the trial that the engineer was
grossly negligent in not blocking the wheels of the engine
before setting the laborer at work. The Court held that the
Company was liable. Judge Robinson in delivering the opin-
ion of the Court said," In running its cars the Company is
requited to observe at least, ordinary care, vigilance and
skill so far as strangers are concerned.,' 'Had the appelle
been a stranger, the appellant would., therefore, have been
certainly liable on this action and ae cannot admit that the
appellants relation as an cmployee whould exempt the Company
from that general liability,' Conrnon laborers in their em-
ployment having nothing to do wIith t?.e.cars or the running of
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them, they, like the Companies mere wood choppers, are com-
paritive strangers to the engineer, , ard his running oper-
ations, and should be entitled to all the security of strang-
ers. They know nothing of the skill or care of the engineer
nor have they any control over him. They are not therefore
in the essential sense of contradistinctivo classification.
In the soa c service with him.' ' The only consistent or
maintainable principle of the corporations responsibility is
that of agency.' It is, the-oefore, resposible for the
negligence of its engineers, as its controlling agent in the
management of its locomotives and running cars, and that re-
sponsibility is graduated by the classes of persons injured
by the engineers' neglect or want of skill-- as to strangers,
ordinary negligence is sufficient-- as to subordinate em-
ployees, associated with the engineer in running the cars,
the negligencc must be gross-- but as to employees in a dif-
ferent department of service, ordinary negligence may be suf-
ficient."
This case was followed in Z.& 11.R.R. v.Robinson, 4 Bush,
507. Hero a brakeman was run over by an engine. It was
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proven that tho cirineor was grossly negligent, and the Court
held that the Compa. .y vrs liable.
The rule therefore in Kentucky as laid dovn by these
cases depends upon the degree of negligence and that only.
If the injury es caused by an employee in a different depart-
ment, the company is liable if there has been ordinary neg-
ligoncn,. And as to subordinate employees in the same gener-
al service the negligence mnust be gross.
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DUTIES OF THE RAILROAD COMPANY TO T FMIR 7i PLOYEEO.
Railway Companies must use reasonable care in fur-
nishing a safe place to work. They must use reasonable care
in selecting machinery, tools, and appliances to work with.
They must use reasonable care in selecting co-employees to
see whether they are competent and skillful. And he must
make reasonable rules and regulations for -their safety. And
they must use care in the original construction and subse-
quent maintainance in repair of its lines.
These are the rules laid down by all text book writers
as the duties which a railroad owes to its employees. But
thoese requirements can be waived by the employee and will
be, if he knowing the ;.dfc~ts as well as his employers, still
proceeds with his work without protest. it is the duty of
an wmployee who knows of any defect in those requirements to
notify his employer at once. If he knows of these defects
alad still goes on and works, saying nothing about them he is
estopped from setting up the negligence of the company.
This was decided in the Massachusetts case of Ladc v. New
-21-
Bedford R.R.Co. There Ladd was a road master and was injured
by a train, on which he was riding being thrown over an on-
bankment. The cars on the train had no check chains and
that he knew that it was dcngorous for a train to run without
them. Upon this evidence the Court held that it was the
duty of Ladd to notify the Company of their absence abd as he
did no* he was estopped from recovering damages by his own
negligence.
The question then arises what must the employee do upon
discovering some defect to hold the company liable. This
h'a 7 . in a groat number of cases. He must
leave the ccrnpnary or notify the company ot its agent of such
defects. If after kavitg given such notice , the Company
promises to make necessary repairs, and requests the employee
to remain in their service, the Company is liable for all
damages which may arise tkrough such defects before they are
repaired. This was decided in Patterson v. Pittsburg &
Connellsville R.R.Co. There Patterson was a conductor of a
freight train. It was his duty to switch certain coal cars
off on a switch, for the purpose of unloading the coal on a
-22-
Platform. The switch wcs very dangerous on account of the
shortness of the curve, and the improper construction of the
frog. The plaintiff knew of these defects and notified
the Company. The company promised to remedy them and re-
quested plaintiff to reltain in their employ while such re-
pairs were being made. The plaintiff did remain and was
injured by having a car run off the switch upon which he
was riding. The Court held that the Company were liable.
THE DUTY OF THE RAIL.W'AY CO14PANY AS TO THE EXERCISE OF CARE ON
ITS P ART IN THE ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTIO., INSPECTION. AND MAIN-
TAINANCE IN PiPAIR OF ITS LINES., ROLLING STOCK AND APPLIANCES.
The company does not guarantee to their employees
that thoir lines, appliances, a.:cI machinery are in a safe
condition. They only, guarantee that they will exercise
due care in building and keeping in repair such lines and
machinery.
They are lot bound to supply the best appliances on
the market, but they must supply such appliances as are reas-
onable safeo and suitable, or such as any prudent person would
supply. in similar circumstances.
Foliowing these rules the Courts of different states
have held that the Company need not supply all of the latest
inventions, That they are not liable-because the road bed
is intersected with ditches; because its switch frogs are
not blocked; nor because its car platforms are of unequal
heights.
But it is a railway duty to make frequent and thorough
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inspections of its line and appliances. In ordor that a
railway may be assured that its lines and appliancos are in
a safe condition they are bound to make such frequent and
thorough inspections as can be done consistently with the
conduct of its business.
It is impossible to lay down precise rules as to deter-
mine when a company has been negligent im making inspections
and when it has not. Each case raust be determined by its
own facts. Under circumstances of more than ordinary peril,
as in the case of violent storms, the Company must inspect
its lines with more than ordinary care and promptness.
The Company is liable for all negligence in the original
construction of its lines, and, although a competent contract-
or has been employed for that purpose.
The Courts of a great nany states hold that when a rail-
way Company receives cars for transportation from another line
it raust make a thorough inspection to see whether they are
safe and in good repair. If they are not they should refuse
to handle them until such defects have been repaired. But
the same Courts hold that this rule only externds to obvious
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defects, and not to latent. In Golleib v. N.Y.L.E.& W.R.R.
Co., the Company was held liable to a brakem-an who was in-
jured while coupling cfefective cars which had been received
from another line for transportaion. Earle J. said, "1 The
defendant was unfer obligations to his employees to exercise
reasonable care and diligence in furnishing them safe and
suitable instriuments, cars, and ,*.achinery for the discharge
of their duty,.' ' The defect was an obvious one easily dis-
covered by the most ordinary inspection, and it would seem
to be the grossest negligence to put such cars into any train2'
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THE LU2Y OF TKE COMPANY AS TO
THE SEL1ICTICN A/AN RETENTION OF ShLRVANTS.
A railway Company rmust use due care in its selection
and retention in its service of its employees. If it is in
any way negligent, it -vill be liable for all damages whic7
may arise. But in order to render the Company liable it
must be shown that the negligence of the incompetent servant
was the oroximate cause of the accident, and that the officer
who is charged with the duty of appointing and dismissing
servants either knew or ought t have known of the servant's
incompotency.
The Company will be liable if it keeps in its service an
employee whose habits are Lnowrn to be intemperate. This
was decided in the case of Decker v. H.& B.T.R.& C.Co.,82
Pa.St.,119. In this case Decker was an engineer on a coal
train. One Bowser was a cond&ctor on another train. The
cars were running in opposite directions, and the train dis-
patcher gave Bowser directions to lot the coal train pass at
a certain place. He was intoxicated and did not obey the
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instructions. The trains came into collision and Decker
was killed. It vas proven on the trial that Bowser was
habitually drunk, and that the Co-pany knew of it. The
Court thereupon directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the
ground that the Company were liable for keeping an habitual
drunkard in their employ.
The Company will also be liable for keeping in its
employ a conductor who cannot °i e depended upon and who
always disobeys orders.
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AS TO THlE RULES AND JE]GULATIONS
WHICH TE COIPANY ARE OBLIGED TO 11AKE.
Every railroad is bound to establish and ebforce
such rules and regulations as arq necessary for the safety of
their servants. What these rules should be will depend on
the circustuces in cach case.
.Anon,-, the most important ones are these. The Company
should lay dovm rules regulating the speed of trains. Rules
which determine the exact duty of each employee. If the
road is a single track, rulos should be laid dovr which will
govern the passing of trains. There are a great many others
which might be named, but these will suffice for examples.
At one time there was a great many -sputes a  to whether
the Company would be liable for damages brought about by the
brpea.ng cf these rules I-% a co-eploorco, but I think that
by a careful reading of the cases at the present time that
it is easily determined.
,'Tho case of Rose v. B. & H.R.R.Co., 5, H.Y.,217, e,
to settle the law in N1ew York on this point. The case arose
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in this way. Rose was a brakeman on a freight train. The
Company had established a rule that its trains should nct be
started within ten rnute of each other. A conductor
and co-employee of Rose violated this rule by sending out
three trains from East Albany at four minutes intervals.
The head train broke ijito and collidud l]ith the second. Rose
was thrown from his car by the collision and killed.
Johnston J. in writing the opinion !-.id down the r-ule
that the Company would not be liable for an injury brought
about by the disobedience of the rules of the Company by a
co-omployee.
-his ruc has been generally followed in all the states.
But On the other hnxnd it has been held by sood authority that
a Railway. Company is liable if it knowingly permits its em-
ployees to habitually disregard the rules. This was held in
0.& M.R.R. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261. In this case a brakeman
was injured by the carelessness handling of an oxvgine by a
fireman. On the trial it was proven that the engineer was,
to the knowledge of the Company, in the habit of trusting the
control of his engine to his fireran in disobedience to the
rules and regulations. The Court hold that the Company was
a party to the negligence and was liable. It was further
hold thl-t the Comp1any would undoubtedly be liable for the
b-- 17- - any of the rules unless i4 Lih user every pre-
cayticn to guard against it.
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STATUTES EFFECTiNG THE CO-EIAPLOYE LIABILI2Y DOCTRINrE
In eight states of the Union statuts have been
passed which materially modify tho rules of co-employee lia=I-
bility. These states are Georgia, Kansas, Montana, Iowa,
Mississippi, Wyoming, and Rhode island.
These statutes iL. general declarc, that the Company shall
be liable to their employees for all negligence or mismanage-
ment by their agents or other employees. That is that if an
employee is injured through the negligence of a co-employee,
the.Compcnay is still liable unless the injury was brought
about through the carelessness of the person injured.
There is a great deal of difficulty as every lawyer will
admit with the doctrine of follow servant. For over forty
years the Court-s of this clountry have been perplexed with
this troublesome question; and every decision rendered by the
Courts, instead of settline- it, has only produced new pvr-
plexities.
The whole trouble is caused by the attempt of the Courts
to make a distinction between the different classes of ser-
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vants, instead of considering them all in one light.
Unless the l.egislaturcs of the vatious states pass a
statute settling this question at rest, the law of the sub-
ject will soon be in such a- state s to be uttcerly valueless.
The reasons that have leeo _. S, ,c, for exempting a Railway
Company from liability for injury to one servant by the neg-
ligence of another servant are state(d in the case of C.Ti.&
St.P.R.R.Co., v. Ross, 112 U..377. Chief Justice Field de-
livered the opinion of' the Court and said, 11 The general
liability of a railway company for injuries caused by the
negligence of its servants, to iasscngers and others not in
its "service is conceded.' 'it covers all injuries to which
they do not contribute, but which injuries befall a servant
in its employ a different principle prevails.' ' Having been
engaged for the perfon.ace of specific services, he takes
upon himself the ordinary ris]ts -cIdnt t]erewith.' A s a
consequence, if he suffers by exposure to them, he cannot
recover compensation from his employer.' ' The obvious reason
for this exception is that he has, or in law, is supposed to
have them in contemplation when he -,a i the service,
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and that his 6ompCnsation is arranged accordingly.' ' He
cannot, in reason, if he suffers f'ro., a which he has
voluntarily assumed, and for the assaumption of which he is
paid."
" There is also ;nother reason ofton assigned for this
exemption that of a supposed public policy.' It is assumed
that the exemption operates as a stimulate to diligence and
caution on the part of the servant, for his own safety as
well as that of his master."
" Much potency is ascribed to this assumed fact by ref-
erence to those cases vhore dilige-ce mud caution on the
part of the servants cc:stitutes the chief p-'otection against
accidents. But it may be doubted whether the exemption has
the effect thus claimed for it. We have never knovrn parties
more willingly to subject themsc~lves to dangers of life or
limb because, of losing the one, or suffering in the other,
dI2age- could be recovered by their rerpresentatives or by
themselves for the loss or injury. The dread of personal
injury has always proved sufficient to bring into exercise the
vigilance and activity of the serva;nt."
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This opinion written by Justice 1icld is considorcd to
be one of the best opinions ever v;rittoi. on this subject, and
I thinLi gives fully the :ac " - follow -ervant cloct-
rine'.
He disposes of the reason last assigne,. fully so but
little -more need be said upon it. To hold that the fact
that no fae.ages would be iven would increase the servant's
regard for his own safety is to contradict and go against all
rules of hunan nature. It would be utterly foolish to sup-
pose that a servant would be one d.e-roo less careful if he
were allowed to recover' d.:mes vwhi c have ben caused by
another and most likely an utter stranger to him.
The other reason given by Justice Field, to wit, that
the servant takes upon himself the ordihary risks incident to
the service, needs a- more careful consideration.
This may be a good doctrine but as applied by the Courts
at the present time it is to arbitrary, and hard. Looking
at this doctrine it will be as-k1edk. what " arc ordinary risks"
They are those risks which the Courts declare the servant
assumes. 71ho are the servants who assume these Risks?
They are these servants whom the Court arbitrarily says as-
sume these risks. This seems to be the logic of the Courts
at the :present time.
The Courts say that the servant has his conprensation
arranged according to the degree of danger, i s this so or
not? It may be so in theory but is certainly not in actual
practice. Vhere is there an employer who gives his servant
a larger compensation when he directs him to perform a dan-
gerous service. Where is the railroad Company who pays,
those onployces, who risk their lives and limbs daily, more
than the employee, who occupy a safe position and assume no
risks. It is just the opposite. It will be found by
actual exporience that those employees who occupy a safe
position are paid double the amount p-.id to those who put
their lives in danger ever:- moment.
It seems to be a waste of tim, to discuss the doctrine
of fellow servant if, indeed, there can be said to be any
settled doctrine in the U.S.. The reacns upon which it is
supposed to be founded are manifest absurdities and should be
abolished. All servants of the same -aster should be upon
an cqual footing, so far as their ri }Cih6t to recover for the
negligence of other servants is concerned. The railroad
Company should be liable in all cases or ;-ot at all.
F I NIS.
